Fordham Law Review
Volume 38

Issue 4

Article 8

1970

Book Reviews

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Book Reviews, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 837 (1970).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol38/iss4/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

BOOKS REVIEWED
International Legal Process: Materials for an Introductory Course (2

vols.). By Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich & Andreas F. Lowenfeld. Boston:
Little, Brown and Company. 1968. Pp. xxiii, 1402. Documents Supplement.
Pp. vi, 635. $22.50.
The basic thrust of the highly innovative Chayes, Ehrlich, and Lowenfeld
text book, InternationalLegal Process was expressed by Professor Chayes in
1962 while he still was serving as Legal Adviser to the Department of State. At
that time he condemned some international lawyers for seeking "a norm that says
this is legal or it is not legal..
, He argued that "institutional components
-.. are as important in the development of law as the elaboration of substantive
norms." 2 In International Legal Process, the student tests this premise as he
confronts a series of problems taken from contemporary experience to illustrate
the role of law, lawyers, and legal institutions in facilitating international
cooperation and in adjusting conflicts among nations. As the authors acknowledge,3 they are heavily indebted to Professors Hart and Sacks whose materials
on domestic legal process4 have contributed so significantly toward better appreciation of our own legal system.
The problems in the Chayes book, falling under three subheadings-Limits of
Adjudication, Economic Affairs, and Political Problems-have been selected for
maximum relevance to contemporary international life and for the broad overview of international legal studies which they provide. They incorporate a
wide variety of materials-excerpts from U.N. and O.A.S. debates, diplomatic
correspondence, New York Times clippings, as well as the more traditional court
decisions and treaties. Throughout the book, one finds textual material providing historical economic and political background and outlining applicable
rules of international law. Of critical importance in aiding student analysis are
1. Haxnmarskjold Forums, The Inter-American Security System and the Cuban Crisis
56 (1964).

2. Id.
3. A. Chayes, T. Ehrlich & A. Lowenfeld, International Legal Process: Materials for an
Introductory Course xxi (1968) [hereinafter cited as Chayes].
4. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (1958). The preface of this book indicates that its purpose is "the study of law
as an on-going, functioning, purposive process and, in particular, with the study of the
various institutions, both official and private, through which the process is carried on." Id.
at iii.
S. Among the seventeen problems included are: "Problem I, International Law in National Courts: The Sabbatino Case;" 'Problem IV, International Trade: The Chicken War;"
'Problem IX, An International Operating Agency: The Communications Satellite Corporation and the International Consortium for Satellite Communications;" 'Problem XII, Bilateral Treaty Relations: The Panama Canal;" and "Problem XlV, The Cuban Msle

Crisis."
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the series of highly incisive questions focusing from varying perspectives on
key issues raised by the problems.

The approach just described contrasts dramatically with the other textbooks
in the area. Professor Bishop's work, which has long been the principal law
school international law text 6 and is presently undergoing revision, concentrates
on the definition, elaboration, and analysis of rules of international law. In this
respect it is excellent and comprehensive, constituting a valuable teaching and
research tool. The book's thrust was well described in a review of the 1962
edition:
Editors of casebooks on international law have by now developed a standard

outline-in terms of system as well as method-in the best tradition of occidental
legal thought. They prefer the abstract and legalistic over the somber facts of international life, including diplomacy, for the understanding of the gist of conflicts.7

A more recent international law text book by several Columbia University
professors s substantially resembles the Bishop book in its "cases and materials"
orientation. However, the selection and quantity of materials represents a recognition of new far reaching developments in international law, particularly
those in the areas of international organization and regulation of the use of
force.
Both International Legal Process and the two other books discussed were
designed for introductory courses. 9 The extreme divergence in approach between
Chayes and these other books presents the international law teacher with a difficult choice. This reviewer decided to adopt International Legal Process for his
course. The opinions expressed therefore to some degree result from the experience of utilizing the book in a small class in a three semester hour course as
well as from having studied with Professor Chayes when the book was not yet
in its final form.
The book's authors recognize that "no limited group of problems can present
the entire spectrum of international legal questions." 10 Thus, at the outset, the
teacher must reconcile himself to the fact that the student utilizing this book
will not have the opportunity to become conversant with significant segments
of substantive international law. This is not to suggest that the student does
not amass considerable knowledge of substantive principles while working
through the problems. A possible answer to the problem of substantive gaps
is to assign for outside reading, as this reviewer did, Brierly's The Law of Nations," a traditionally oriented short text on international law. Another significant factor in evaluating Chayes for classroom use is that the student prob6. W. Bishop, International Law: Cases and Materials (2d ed. 1962).
7. Bayitch, 16 J. Legal Ed. 243 (1963).
8. W. Friedmann, 0. Lissitzyn & R. Pugh, International Law: Cases and Materials
(1969).
9. Of course, the Chayes book can be utilized in connection with specialized courses
such as those in International Trade or International Organizations.
10. Chayes at vii.
11. J. Brierly, The Law of Nations (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963).
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ably wil face a rather unfamiliar pedagogical approach since his law school
experience unfortunately still tends primarily to consist of case method study.12
As the book's introduction states:
[T]he reader is not asked to analyze from the point of view of the appellate
judge a case already abstracted from the give and take of real life. Rather, he is
asked to place himself in the various roles of litigant, advocate, policy-maker, and
observer, as well as judge, trying to resolve a situation in which, as in practice,
the facts are not all "given" and the procedures not already decided. 13
Thus, there is unlikely to be the same comfortable sense he gets from studying
the subject matter on a chapter by chapter basis with everything organized
under neat headings and subdivisions. This is a virtue. Despite difficulties encountered, the reaction of the reviewer's students was enthusiastic.' 4 Their
interest in international law was stimulated; they regarded the problems as a
challenge, calling for creative thinking. While the reviewer was pleased with
the results obtained with Chayes, it is important to note that use of the book
in larger classes, as is currently being done in many schools, would appear to
present substantial difficulties calling for a more rigid structuring of class time. 15
However, the decisive factor in choosing Chayes, whether the class is large or
small, is that since most students will have sustained contact with international
legal problems only in a single introductory course, it is far preferable for
them to gain some overall perspective on the present and possible future role
of the international legal system, even if at the expense of learning a little less
substantive law. The treatment of international law in the traditional casebook
form is inherently misleading to the uninitiated student whose approach to law
has been shaped by the study of domestic legal institutions. He is imbued with
the concept of a hierarchical system in which third party adjudication is predominant, in which demands for change can be met through new legislation and
in which enforcement machinery is well developed. Only by exposure to the flesh
as wel as the skeleton of the international legal system can the student begin
to comprehend its distinctively decentralized nature and assess for himself the
relevance of international law to the solution of problems arising out of relations
among nations.
RoBnmT D. KAmEN smE*
12. See Bok, A Different Way of Looking at the World, 20 Harv. Law School Bull.
No. 4, 2 (1969) for an excellent discussion of student criticism of the over use of the case
method and lack of relevance of law school courses.
13. Chayes at xix.
14. This was ascertained from informal discussion with students and from a written
course evaluation submitted by each student at the end of the semester.
15. The authors indicate that they have required their students to submit brief written
assignments, a few students for each problem, so that each student gets an in depth exposure -to at-least- one set of issues. A recent communication from the publisher states that
these writing assignments will be made available to those who adopt the book.
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
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Married Today, Single Tomorrow: Marriage Breakup and the Law. By
Kenneth and Irene Donelson. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc. 1969.
Pp. xi, 320. $6.95.
With divorce and remarriage tolerated in almost every segment of society
today, and with the resulting liberalization of the divorce laws, the practice of
matrimonial law is rapidly becoming a more respected and respectable speciality.
However, guidance through the still complex legal road to divorce and dissolution of marriage is only a part of the problem for which clients seek help.
They are undergoing a traumatic experience. However, the busy lawyer, often
ill qualified to play the role of psychologist, financial advisor and general
confidant, hesitates to become too involved in these human relations aspects.
The ideal situation, of course, would be for one person to be able to counsel
on financial, sociological and emotional problems which accompany marriage
breakup or loss of a spouse through death. Perhaps the answer is found in the
Donelsons' work.
The book was written to help two groups of people:
1. Unhappy and confused wives headed for or going through legal breakup of marriage, or suddenly left alone through death.
2. Their friends and relatives upon whom these women lean.'
So thoroughly have the authors covered the subject that a reading of the
volume will bring back memories of every case ever handled by the lawyer.
The book is divided into three parts: the first, entitled "Emotional Breakup
of a Marriage," deals with the troubles which precede the actual disintegration
of the marriage and is concerned with the causes of marital dissension and the
sources of help which could yet bring peace to the relationship. The second,
entitled "Legal Breakup of a Marriage," deals with the various legal, social,
emotional and financial aspects of marriage dissolution. Within this section is
a list of organizations and individuals whose professional qualifications enable
them to assist in particular types of marital difficulties. Here, the client is
also informed on how to assist her lawyer in preparing the case. The questions
of support, attorneys' fees, and general conduct during the whole ordeal are
also covered. Advice is clear-cut and to the point. For example:
If possible you should avoid using your attorney as an emotional leaning post.
Some decisions must be made by you alone. Your lawyer can suggest certain steps,
but you will have to decide such things as whether to hire a private investigator for
your case, whether to go back to work yourself to supplement what your husband
pays you, whether2 to move to cheaper living quarters or to go back home to stay
with your parents.
This is good advice and much more impressive for the client to get it from
a source other than the lawyer, since if he tells her the same thing she might
1. I. Donelson & K. Donelson, Married Today, Single Tomorrow: Marriage Breakup
and the Law 5 (1969).
2. Id. at 140.
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feel that he is just trying to make things easier for himself. The section ends
with a Post-Divorce Check List 3 relative to business and personal matters.
Part three is entitled "After a Marriage Breaks Up" and is concerned with
picking up the pieces after marriage dissolution. It ends with a chapter optimistically called "When You Marry Again."
Hatred and revenge are burning emotions; they leave their imprint on any face,
regardless of its original beauty. They also produce inner tensions that contribute
to hard facial lines and wrinkled brow. Such tension, in turn, may lead to ulcers and
other physical symptoms. Martyrdom, on the other hand, draws the lips and mouth
into a tight-set line surrounded by a wan, but dull, look of pseudo-saintly sadness.
Tears and insomnia also take their toll of your appearance. None of these things
add to your attractiveness as a woman. And that is something to keep in mind,
because divorce need not be the end of your life; it could be the beginning of a
new and more successful life. Don't let your emotions rob you of that opportunity.4
This book is also written with the widow in mind. She may find herself
suddenly alone without having had the advantage of time for psychological
and economic appraisal of her future life situation. Unfortunately, many widows
are woefully unprepared for life without a husband. Chapter XVIII will
help them to understand what the attorney is trying to accomplish for them
and why he must follow certain legal procedures. It emphasizes, too, the importance of financial advisors for the widow without business experience.
About the authors: Kenneth Donelson is a lawyer. His wife, Irene, has long
assisted him as a legal researcher. Together they have written an easy-to-read
book that should be in the library of the matrimonial lawyer. Better yet, it
should be kept circulating among his clients.5
ROSEMARY E. Bucci*

Democracy, Dissent, and Disorder: The Issues and the Law. By Robert F.
Drinan, S.J. New York: The Seabury Press. 1969. Pp. vi, 152. $4.95.
Dean Drinan's friends will be pleased by his latest contribution to legal
thought. He deals not only with a large number of the more pressing legal issues
confronting our society, but also with the fundamental notions of morality.1
3. Id. at 213.
4. Id. at 167.
5. Due to the fifty different varieties of state laws covering marriage, divorce and
estates, the Donelsons had a gigantic task in generalizing the law to fit situations all over
the country. They have done their work well, but it may be wise to anticipate the possibility of confusion where a particular state has different laws or procedures. A preview
of the book by the attorney, before circulating it to his client, can easily elininate this
problem.
* Lecturer in Domestic Relations at Syracuse University College of Law.
1. These notions of morality encompass the impact of morals on law, whether conceived to be outside of "the laws," operating to modify positive law, or whether inherent

within "the laws."
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These notions are employed as a starting point in a critical analysis of existing legal institutions and our common law traditions. Within this scope many

challenging ideas are presented in an attempt to stimulate thinking in order to
facilitate the discovery of possible solutions.
The author sets forth the following specific problems, as a framework of
inquiry: 1) discriminatory practices against the black community, termed the
"Black Revolution," 2) the escalation of crime and juvenile delinquency, 3)
the erosion of family stability, 4) the growing student unrest, and 5) a large
number of related areas, namely labor and working conditions, housing, the

growing poverty level, and the plight of the Third World.
These precise issues contribute to the larger consideration: the decline in
confidence toward legal institutions and the continued questioning, often leading

to outright rejection, of the previously accepted American way of life and its
underlying moral standards. The counter reaction is a demand for more stringent
law enforcement. One of Father Drinan's main purposes is to expose the fallacies behind the cry for "law and order." Subsequently, specific proposals are
advanced to correct the weaknesses of our society. But it is helpful to observe
at this point that his presentation of ideas is more important than the solutions
offered since many of the recommendations are already known and accepted,
as for example, the strengthening of the family and the improvement of the
administration of justice.
It must be mentioned that this book is not a piece of research, as might
have been expected from a noted author and law school dean, but is rather
a statement of the philosophy of the author. That is to say, no preface, bibliography, or table of cases is to be found. Nor have footnotes of any significance
been included. The author's purpose is to expose and analyze problems, which
in turn, are intended to challenge the thought of readers. This statement is not
meant to imply that overtones of scholarship do not emerge; still it is essential
for a reader (or reviewer) to properly comprehend the author's intended purpose, so as to consider this work sympathetically, though critically. Because of
Drinan's approach, it is easy to select certain passages and specific issues for the
purpose of dispute.
The book is divided into two main parts, the first of which, "Current Dissent
and Disorder," presents the areas of conflict (or more specifically the problems
presented for analysis). The second part, "Law and Morality In a Democracy,"
analyzes possible solutions. The final five chapters offer several precise recommendations.
The underlying goal of the first part is to refute the advocates of "law and
order,"--that is, primarily the ultra-conservative upper middle class who, it is
alleged, seek to restore outward tranquility by the employment of more stringent
law enforcement measures. At this stage the author attempts to demonstrate
that merely attacking an outward manifestation,-the violence-will not produce
lasting solutions. In this context the words of John F. Kennedy emerge: " 'those
who make peaceful revolution impossible make violent revolution inevitable.' ",2
2. R. Drinan, Democracy, Dissent, and Disorder: The Issues and the Law 3-4 (1969)
[hereinafter dted as Drinan).
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While fundamental changes must take place within our moral and legal order,
one basic norm should never be lost sight of: "obedience to lawful authority
is the first imperative of free men and of a free society." 3 This theme of obedience to positive law is constantly repeated. The reader must recognize that
while the author is extremely sympathetic toward the militants in our society,
he insists on preserving that society. His aim is the preservation of our social
order through peaceful changes. In demonstrating the discrimination shown
toward the militants, this reviewer is of the opinion that the author's case is
a bit overemphasized. For example, repeated reference is made to discriminatory
practices in the armed forces against Negroes until 1947, restrictive housing
covenants until 1948, and racially segregated schools until 1954. These
illustrations are completely outdated. The point the author is emphasizing is
that the law was a tool in enforcing such discrimination. While historically the
position is valid, Dean Drinan does not provide insight into current court
actions. In 1969 and 1970 the federal courts have made significant attempts
to eliminate racial inequality. It would have been more helpful if current data
were relied upon.
Realistically every informed reader is aware of the factual situation behind
current unrest, at least as to the major issues such as the Black Revolution and
the Vietnam protests. One of the main shortcomings of the book is its failure
to present both sides of these types of controversies. It seems as if only the more
extreme, though not typical examples, of minority relationships are relied upon.
It would possibly have been more objective if recent improvements had been
mentioned, such as the concerted efforts of the federal government against
segregation in labor unions, southern states, local school boards, etc. The conclusion that anti-discrimination laws are relatively ineffective seems open to
question. 4
In all fairness to the author, he is functioning in the capacity of an advocate,
presenting the strongest case possible, in order to lay a foundation for later
recommendations. The approach he uses to show the underlying Sense of Injustice5 is to look at laws, enacted often without the consent or participation,
from the vantage point of the recipient,--that is, the minority groups.0 This
technique has the effect of forcing legally trained readers to adopt a different
point of departure when reconsidering the plight of minority groups. However,
this reviewer is of the opinion that the total effect of the technique is to overemphasize injustice: "Irish-Americans, for example, are even now still virtually
excluded from the top echelons of management in banking and law."7 (Parenthetically, this reviewer, possessing an Irish name, does wonder about the
accuracy of the statement.) s Yet, the magnitude of the problem should not be
3. Id. at 141.

4. Id. at 53.
5. Id. at 17-25.
6. This perspective seems reminiscent of the late Edmond Cahn's "Consumer Perspective." See E. Cahn, The Predicament of Democratic Man 23-32 (1961). See also E. Cahn,
The Sense of Injustice: An Anthropocentric View of Law (1949).
7. Drinan at 49.
8. Dean Drinan's full statement reads as follows: "Other American minorities suc-
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minimized: "The black American is surrounded by problems never encountered
by any group, not merely in America but in the whole history of Western
culture. No nation in modern European history ever faced a nonwhite African
minority as substantial as the Negro race in the United States."0
At this point, a proposition is advanced that recurs several times in the
concluding chapters: the use of law to change society. Normally, law reflects
the existing social order, or the immediately preceding social order. However,
because of the magnitude of current dissent and disorder, law must, by itself,
help to secure needed reforms. 10
It is impossible to comment upon all aspects of the book without in effect
reproducing the text. Yet several areas must be noted, particularly the third
chapter, dealing with student unrest, and the sixth chapter, dealing with aspects
of the Vietnam protests. Not only is the content of both chapters closely connected, but a fundamental issue emerges: what recourse is open after estab.
lished legal and political remedies have proved inadequate? What can an individual or group do? It needs to be stressed that Father Drinan repeatedly
restates his premise that all lawful means must have been exhausted. Sheer
lawlessness can never be condoned. Nevertheless, by what standard can the
present disruption of positive law in the name of Higher Law be measured?
What is the moral justification? The most striking illustration of direct action
can be seen in the French riots of May and June 1968, for they succeeded in
securing needed reforms while, at the same time, destroying the financial stability of the state:
American students can be expected to be impressed for some time to come with
the fact that the riots in May and June of 1968 in France were so devastating to the
Ministry of Education and to the entire government that the first major change In
French higher education since the time of Napoleon took place on February 15, 1969.
That change, initiated by the French government through its Minister of Education,
Edgar Faure, did not come about because of the hundreds of books which have been
The change-which everyone
written about the bureaucracy in French education ....
would have to concede is long overdue-was forced on France by student power and
by the threat of more student power. Students in France won a stunning victory-a
victory which is certain to intensify student militancy everywhere in the world. 1
The basic issue remains: can such violence be deemed moral, even if desirable
results are obtained? This question is not answered; rather four points of
reference are given, for the purpose of future analysis:
(a) Have all available legal and political procedures been exhausted?
(b) Has every attempt been made to bring the protestors' moral case to the people
cumbed to apathy and indifference under far less oppressive conditions [than the black
minority]. Irish-Americans, for example, are even now still virtually excluded from the
top echelons of management in banking and law. Italian-Americans are not present in a
number of industries and activities and Americans of the Jewish faith have not risen very
high in middle or top management of the automotive industry." Id.
9. Id. at 57.
10. Id. at 51.
11. Id. at 34.
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during and after the time when the ordinary legal and political processes have failed
to resolve the problem?
(c) Has every effort been made to follow a path of passive resistance, nonviolent protest, and other forms of action less drastic than that of open defiance of law and
authority?
(d) Is the objective to be attained sufficiently significant to justify the dislocations
to the public good brought about by the temporary upheavals?'
These criteria are intended to function within the larger context of the moral
duty to give obedience to the civil law. They are not inconsistent with respect
for positive (or enacted) law. Nonetheless, the conclusion offered is that reliance
on "law and order," which 13will make peaceful revolution impossible, can only
result in continued disorder.
Rather arbitrarily, this review will not deal at length with the problem of
the poor, since the facts are well known. But one section, "The Poor of the
World," merits attention.' 4 No one can deny the plight of the Third World
or the fact that over half of the world's population is hungry. But the approach
used is to equate the sovereign states of the world with a family or group of
neighbors.' 5 It is argued: "The underdeveloped nations are voiceless and powerless ...."6 This type of reasoning has already been criticized as contributing

to an oversimplification. It is also highly emotional; and, in the present instance,
it leads to inaccuracy, since not only are the underdeveloped nations of Africa,
Asia and Latin America powerful, but they are certainly the most vocal bloc
within regional and international organizations. Indeed, they are often so excessively vocal that their own cause is injured. Within the United Nations they
dominate the General Assembly; they have changed the programs of WHO and
UNESCO; they constitute a majority of the membership (and even chairmanships) in the majority of U.N. committees and conferences. In the Trusteeship Council the major powers are forced to cooperate and compromise with
weaker non-administering states. In fact, the highest official in the World
Organization, the Secretary-General, is a national of a developing state. Only
in the Security Council are the major powers supreme because of the veto.1
12. Id. at 34-35.
13. "[Tjhose advocates of law and order who seek in effect a society where there is a
cessation of all attempts by forceful, nonviolent means to achieve an objective have
failed to realize that students and other groups, who have lost faith in the efficacy of the
ordinary legal and political processes, will continue to seek to have a free soiety even if
for a period it is not an ordered one. Those who prefer an ordered society above all else
must pay the price for that preference-a continued and vigilent sensitivity to the dals
of the members of any group who feel that the 'peaceful revolution,' which is the American dream for everyone, is not attainable for them." Id. at 35.

14. Id. at 41-44.
15. Id. at 43.
16. Id.
17. A similar conclusion is applicable even to the International Labor Organization's
decentralization of its operations into regional groupings. A single illustration of the power
of the smaller states can be seen in the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of
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May it be suggested, the major cause of friction is not "colonialism" (with
the exception of Portugal) but the enforced regimes of apartheid. The perpetrators of this international crime are not the rich or powerful states.
The reviewer has, perhaps unfairly, selected the weakest portion of the text
to demonstrate the havoc that can result from over-generalized analogies. The
objective sought by the author is laudable, i.e., greater aid from the United
States to developing countries. The motives of the author are beyond question.
All men of good will, and enlightened statesmen, recognize that America cannot
exist as a rich nation, while a significant portion of the world's population lives
in poverty. The precise words of the author are worth repeating: "To think that
a world half-hungry can or will continue to coexist with a world fully fed is an
illusion. The only question is whether the revolution will be peaceful or

violent."' 8
The observation made in connection with student protest is again raised
toward dissenters of the Vietnam War. In "Protest After Legal Methods Have
Failed,"'19 the issue is whether there is, within our democratic form of government, any additional means left to dissenters: "After all legitimate methods of
protest ...

have been exhausted, what do citizens do if they are still convinced

that their government is murdering innocent people?"1120 Obviously, a simplified
formula-or a definitive answer-cannot be given. A return to "law and order"
isrejected.21 After observing that Vietnam dissenters are "chargeable with the
22
most severe punishments .. . to compel acceptance and to deter dissent,
Father Drinan predicts, and quite properly, that students and war dissenters
"will shout from the housetops, employing disorder, disobedience, and dissent
if and when necessary. The American ethic not merely gives them this right
but, in the light of Nuremberg, imposes this duty. 23 The incapacity of the
judicial system to provide meaningful remedies to minority groups is projected
to others in need of help. Prisoners, alcoholics and narcotic addicts, the mentally
retarded, and the aged are in need of immediate medical and psychiatric help.
Prolonged incarceration, although legal, results in continuing injustice. Reforms
are sought.
In seeking Justice (in the sense that this concept is contained within Natural
Law), Dean Drinan employs the interplay of moral and legal elements in order
to analyze the growing paradox of how Americans, who cherish personal freedom
Treaties, concluded in Vienna on May 23, 1969. The resulting Draft Articles clearly reflect the rising position of the developing nations at the expense of the industrialized
states.
18. Drinan at 42.
19. Id.at 66-68.
20. Id. at 67.
21. May this reviewer add one observation that Father Drinan does not mention in
his book. Police brutality is as contrary to the American tradition and is as equally
abhorrent in a democracy as is student violence.
22. Drinan at 68.
23. Id.
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for themselves, can have "such enormous faith in the power of the civil law.'1 4
Part Two, "Law and Morality in a Democracy," poses possible solutions to
the problems previously raised in the former section. The specific consideration
(in the advocacy of Justice) is the impact of moral considerations on law, including public policy. Thus, the section begins with the basic premise: the duty
to render obedience to law, as drawn from the teachings of St. Paul, 'has had
an incalculable effect upon the American mind." 25 It is essential that the author's fundamental premise be recalled, both when examining his sympathetic
approach to dissatisfied groups and especially when critically examining recommendations for future action. (Parenthetically, it might have been a bit more
helpful to the reader if some of this data concerning the primacy of law had
been presented a bit earlier.) The implication of St. Paul's teaching, that even
unjust laws of the ruler must be obeyed, is adopted. Yet the limitations placed
upon such acceptance are spelled out as follows:
It is understood, of course, that no theory of blind or uncritical obedience to law,
right or wrong, is suggested. What is suggested is a philosophy of law or of society
which holds that in a democracy made up of divergent peoples and in a society which
is religiously and morally pluralistic, obedience to law is a moral imperative until or
unless every remedy to change an unjust law has been unsuccessfully attempted. At
that point, disorders or disobedience may be justified in a democracy. But democracy
by its very nature is a government by the consent of its peoples. And that consent
includes a moral pledge by citizens that they will obey all laws and that, furthermore,
they will disobey an unjust law only after all efforts at altering the unjust law have
come to nought.2 6
The extreme limits of the author's position again emerge when it is stated that
Americans "have not merely the right but the duty to disobey an unjust law."2^
Furthermore: "American democracy embraces both the Pauline teaching of
obedience to law and the Nuremberg principle that men inust refuse obedience
to an unjust law."28 In short, no easy solutions are available.
Following consideration of the ever pressing problem of the respect for property rights in comparison with (but not necessarily opposed to) the rights of
private persons, the conclusion is reached that the primacy of human life has
the highest priority in American law.29 The validity of this conclusion is particularly apparent to this reviewer who has lived within another common law
system for two years. Under English law the protection of property and the
"Establishment" is given a much higher priority than here. A comparative approach to the issue of the value of property as opposed to individual human
rights reveals one inescapable conclusion: the United States Supreme Court is
the main institution in the world today protecting private individuals and groups
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

79.
85.
87.
88.

28. Id.

29. Id. at 90.
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at the expense of vested property interests. Sad to say, because of the book's
advocacy, the positive accomplishments of the existing order have not been
stressed to a sufficient degree.
In Chapter Nine, the full impact of the author's recommendation emerges. A
call is made for a greater "assault on poverty," 30 demanding more aid to the
underprivileged elements. Existing property rights would presumably be modified, although the precise "divesting process" is not spelled out.3 1 A bit later
in the book this idea is carried even further, when it is argued that present day
corporation law must be modified. By decrying the economic crimes of vested
interests, the unrealistic solution appears to be "soak the rich." The precise
target is the American corporation, on the theory that the corporate entity-as
for example the automotive industry in Detroit-serves the stockholders but
not the underprivileged inhabitants of that city. As an example, Dean Drinan
maintains that these corporations were not able "to correct the social injustices
which led to the riots in Detroit. ' 32 In reexamining the right of "absentee
stockholders to be legally entitled to unearned income," 33 he argues that the
American corporation (like the private university) cannot exist as "an island
of affluence in a sea of poverty."'3 4 First, Father Drinan asks: "But can the rules
of free competition be allowed to operate without regulation if such a process
does little to solve the problem of the poor or ease the confinement of the black
to the ghetto?" 35 Hence he concludes, that: "It may well be that an equalization
of the impact of law on the poor and on the rich cannot come about until there
has been a rather fundamental alteration in the legal structure of the American
'30
corporation."
This reviewer does not agree. Socialism does not correct the difficulties of
which the author speaksl The human rights guarantees of minority groups
and the administration of justice have not advanced to any level approaching
the protection given citizens-including the poor-in our country. We must
not adopt solutions more disastrous than the evils they seek to correctl A soak
the rich campaign has never worked to the benefit of the people in the economic
sense, or resulted in equality of law enforcement, or resulted in a greater
recognition of human dignity. This reviewer fully agrees with the aims sought,
but he cannot accept the economic solutions offered. May it be suggested that
Dean Drinan is really dealing with world-wide shortcomings. They are not
unique to the United States, aside perhaps from the fact that the size of
America and its population tend to magnify specific conditions, e.g., the large
30. Id. at 91.
31. "The basic principle which must be clarified, therefore, is not the devotion of law
and society to the sacredness of human life as such but, rather, the extent to which a
higher quality of life for all should be so valued that the vested rights of some to continue
to hold their property should be modified." Id.
32. Id. at 130.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 131.
35. Id. at 130-31.
36. Id. at 130.
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Negro minority. To illustrate, it would be possible to write a very similar book
concerning England, the Netherlands, Eastern Europe, India, or Africa. Compared to these systems, American society is progressing much more satisfactorily
in the legal recognition of the individual and the economic uplifting of the
entire society. A comparative analysis, coupled with a global approach, will
reveal the strengths of our American tradition and constitutional law. While
this reviewer disagrees with the author, it is admitted that this type of material"7
will certainly stimulate critical thinking.
The final chapters advance several very challenging recommendations. In
order to combat the decline of morality and the growing spread of crime, it is
proposed that the public schools devote more attention to the "Teaching of
Moral-Legal Values in Public Schools"-to use the title of Chapter Ten. This
chapter contains some of the best and most practical suggestions offered. Precisely, the aim is to create courses in law and American legal philosophy in
the secondary schools and colleges. Thus, legality and morality would be taught,
simultaneously. Religious dogma would be excluded so as to avoid any constitutional difficulty. The potential of this approach is enormous: it has the
advantage of returning the fundamental values to American society but in a
manner calculated to reach all groups--even the non-religious. In other words,
the teaching of fundamental morality has the advantage of avoiding a clash
with the non-religious or non-secular elements. Those moral values implicit
in our society are consistent with the beliefs of most segments of our people,
not excluding the law and order advocates. Accordingly, the words of Justice
Jackson are quoted: "nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting,
everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated with the religious influences
derived from paganism, Judaism, Christianity-both Catholic and Protestantand other faiths accepted by a large part of the world's peoples." 38
One proposal with which this reviewer agrees is the inclusion of law-appreciation courses in the undergraduate curriculum, on the theory that every
educated person should be exposed to the fundamental concepts of justice and
morality. In other words, moral values within the law, or "the moral values
inseparable from American law should form the basis of the orientation of the
teaching of law in the public school."130 These legal values "have now become
a part of public morality and are thereby state-endorsed.' 40 The author's
message is clear. He has made a major contribution in this portion of the
text. Nevertheless, it is well to note the limits of his proposal to teach morality
in public schools; no attempt is sought to impose state-oriented morals at the
expense of religious beliefs. As demonstrated throughout the book, the limits
of recommendations are carefully indicated.
The theme of governmental participation is extended to governmental control in Chapter Eleven, "The Mass Media and Public Morality." Here an
37. See, e.g., id. at 129-31.
38. Id. at 105.
39. Id. at 104.
40. Id. at 105.
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attack is made against vested interests-this time commercial television. While
it is easy to describe the weaknesses of the American system of "free enterprise"
the solution, a National Foundation for Public Television, is worse than the
"evil." This reviewer is bitterly opposed to governmental control or direction
of any news or entertainment media, largely because of his observation of the
British system of control which often amounts to censorship. Dean Drinan
states: "Clearly the opportunity for the government to influence viewers of
television may be greater than similar opportunities in the public school." 4'
While the aim-the promulgation by the government of "culturally diverse,
broadly representative, and morally educational programming on radio and
television' 4 2 -is laudable, we need only look to societies where such governmental supervision is practiced. This reviewer is not impressed by governmental
control in Great Britain under the Socialist government. Such proposals represent a real danger to our first amendment freedoms. It should be remembered
that one of the original aims of the American Constitution was to limit the
power of the central government.
Chapter Twelve, "Law, Morality and Family Solidarity," comes to grips with
an obvious weakness in our society. Again we are faced with a global problemthe decline of the family. The competence of Father Drinan, as head of the
American Bar Association's Section on Family Law, is well known. His suggestions that a moral consensus be reached and, secondly, that the various state
divorce laws be modified to strengthen the family relationship, are meritorious.
The following chapter, dealing with inequality of law enforcement, restates
many of the injustices discussed in the first portion of the book. The need to
reform the administration of justice, in order to guarantee the fundamental
rights of the poor and minority groups, is beyond challenge. Furthermore,
dangers are imposed by certain governmental practices, e.g., wiretapping. As
is true of several topics raised in the book, an increase in governmental power
will result in infringing the rights of citizens.
The book concludes with an especially fine chapter, "The Role of Churches
and Synagogues," calling for action by all religious groups. Concrete proposals
are offered. Father Drinan is not concerned with the usual generalizations of

"vague religious revivals," so common today. The author proposes that religious
bodies work to change the social order. 43 But, the suggestion that "religious
groups must be prepared to surrender, if necessary, their alliance with existing
political processes and present-day capitalistic thinking"** is difficult to accept.
Regrettably, desirable moral and political objectives are weakened by economic
overtones. One proposal seems worthy of special mention: "Religious groups
must seek to revivify the nation's faith in traditional moral and political values
and processes while at the same time affirmatively developing a theology of
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. To
lengthy to
44. Id.

at 114.
at 116.
achieve this above mentioned objective four specific proposals, sadly too
reproduce here, are set forth. See id. at 139-40.
at 139.
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revolution and of violence."'45 All of these goals must be achieved at the grass
roots level: "All religious men and women must realize that there is no other
local structure in American society besides the church and the synagogue which
can possibly fulfill that roll of mediation and conciliation which is necessary to
restrain widespread panic and to develop a new moral consensus on which the
nation can form a more just society.140 Churches and synagogues must assist
the majority of the populace to accept rapid change. Concerted church action
can do much, the author quite properly maintains, to provide the required
leadership.
Not every reader-or for that matter reviewer-will agree with all statements
made in the book. On the other hand, they will hopefully be stimulated to
reexamine fundamental moral, social, and legal concepts. Indeed, this reviewer
was challenged to such an extent that a lengthy commentary was written of
a text merely one hundred and fifty-two pages, possibly because he chose to
refute those portions with which he disagreed. A great many issues were raised
that could not be examined in the space of this review. Nevertheless, may one
final criticism be offered? The book is far too expensive to reach a large audience.
The author has shown a great deal of courage in writing such a "revolutionary"
study, and the publisher has been equally courageous in bringing out the work
with high quality binding and printing-more in the nature of a library edition
or a collector's item. Consequently, only the affluent upper classes, the target of
the text, will be able to purchase the book. Certainly the mothers on welfare,
Negroes in slum areas, or for that matter, university students, even at the
price five dollars, cannot afford the luxury. This short but excellent study
should have been produced in a very small inexpensive edition, even though
it would have appeared less prestigious. Perhaps it may still be made available
to those persons in need of Dean Drinan's message: the dignity of the human
being.
W. PAUL Go.miEy*
John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland. Edited by Gerald
Gunther. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1969. Pp. vi, 214. $7.50.
In McCudloch v. Maryland,' John Marshall's Supreme Court decided that
Congress could constitutionally charter a bank, and that the State of Maryland
could not tax it. Even with the absence of an express constitutional provision
that Congress can charter a bank, the Court thought banking to be so related
to the powers to tax, to support an army, and to other delegated functions
that the power could be implied.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 139-40 for the full proposal.
* Mr. Gormley, a holder of five postgraduate degrees, is presently a Leverhulme Visiting Fellow at the Faculty of Law, 1969-70, and Simon Research Fellow, 1970-71, University
of Manchester, England.
1.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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Today, this holding would not arouse even our right wing citizens. But in
1819, the decision drew immediate editorial condemnation from a covey of
aristocrats who controlled Virginia's political machinery. It was not the survival
of the national bank that vexed the Virginians. Rather it was the opinion's
pointed pronouncements that Congress' power came from the people, not from
the states, and that the clause permitting Congress to make all laws "necessary
and proper" for carrying out its delegated powers may itself be a grant of power
instead of a rigid restriction on congressional action. Deciding against the
strict constructionists, Marshall made it quite clear that Congress has considerable latitude in determining what is "necessary and proper."
In splitting the power pie between Congress and the states, McCulloch did
indeed give the edge to federal functions. As viewed by nineteenth century
Virginians, this was an intolerable intrusion into states' rights. The Virginians,
still smarting from the Supreme Court's conclusion that federal courts had the
final word on state interpretations of federal laws, had hoped that the "necessary
and proper" clause would restrict the national government to the performance
of just those functions specifically authorized by the Constitution, with a grudging allowance for whatever incidental acts are absolutely indispensable to performing those delegated duties. No one would expect the outraged Virginians
to sit in gentlemanly silence. Writing in the influential Richmond Enquirer, the
politicians predicted an imposition of federal power which would wipe out the
last claim of state sovereignity. An unrestrained Congress would, they cried,
actually go so far as to build roads and canals. Sketching the scenario for
slippery slope salesmen of this century, they declared that the decision would
foist federal universities and churches upon the nation, resulting, I suppose, in
the unhealthy education and eternal damnation of our souls.
Aroused by the attack, Marshall picked out a pseudonym and penned a reply
to be printed in the PhiladelphiaUnion. Unhappily, accurate printing was not
the Union's strong suit, and Marshall's message was badly garbled. Undaunted,
and goaded by a second volley from Virginia, the Chief Justice selected another
pseudonym and angled anew to get a good press and a sober typesetter. This
time, the Alexandria Gazette printed his essays and, fortunately, set the type
right.
Ever the voice of reason and moderation, Marshall denied that the decision
damaged the concept of delegated power or unreasonably enlarged congressional
authority. In soothing terms, Marshall pictured a practically impotent court,
pointing out that it has only such power as the reasoning in its opinions can
garner. But even a powerless court has to do its duty--i.e., to decide those cases
that come before it. This duty includes deciding those difficult disputes dealing
with distribution of governmental power. Congress likewise has to carry out the
functions delegated to it by the Constitution. To do its duty, Congress has to
have the power to perform the necessary steps along the way. To strain every
congressional act through a restrictive "necessary and proper" clause and to
strike down anything which will not stand as the one indispensable way to
reach an authorized aim would render Congress incapable of acting at all.
Clearly, any governmental goal can be accomplished in several ways. Because
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no single method can be called "indispensable," Congress must be allowed some
latitude in picking which one to adopt.
Marshall made a distinction between allowing Congress to have latitude in
performing authorized functions and the proposition that an entirely new list
of federal functions could be written into the Constitution through the "necessary and proper" clause. The latter interpretation of McCulloch .as not what
Marshall intended, according to his essays. He even went so far as to indicate
that the clause could be left out without affecting the power picture.
Gerald Gunther has collected the clippings from this newspaper battle and
published them in John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland. Gunther's personal contributions are a sprightly introduction and the revelation that
it was indeed Marshall who wrote the full set of replies to the Virginians. He
also helpfully ungarbled the Union essay for easier reading. Gunther's editorial
assessment is that, given Marshall's explanation, the McCulloch decision is not
in itself authority for today's federal involvement in fields ranging from farm
and factory control to civil rights.
I am not certain where Gunther thinks this revelation is supposed to leave us.
Unveiling Marshall's explanation is interesting enough historically, but it is not
enough in my mind to turn the entire notion of federal power around. Like it
or not, we have arrived at the twentieth century with a strong set of expectations
concerning the legitimacy and scope of federal power. To what extent these
expectations are based upon scholarly analysis of McCulloch is difficult to say.
It is my guess that the present balance is the result of political compromise
and the necessities of the times, and that citing McCulloch for the expansion
of federal power is simply playing the law game-the rules of which require
citation of some precedent. Gunther would ask us to stop mouthing McCulloch
and address ourselves directly to the question of how much power Congress
needs. This is an attractive idea, but it is not how the law game is played.
Within their system of carefully preserved myth, the law players address the
issue of power allocation about as directly as possible. In the background of
every case dealing with distribution of governmental power, the issue is there.
Unstated and perhaps even unargued, it is certainly not unknown to or unconsidered by the people who sit on the Court. As they decided case by case that
federal power can be extended into new arenas, their citation of McCidloch
has probably been mostly makeweight. Admittedly, it may be necessary makeweight so long as lawyers, judges and law schools perpetuate the myth that
law is determined and controlled by precedent. However, honesty is likely to be
disfunctional in a game where "let's pretend" is the rule.
Although the Court has substantially abandoned the power allocation arena,
the battle is still being fought by able combatants. In every congressional session, the division of responsibility between national and local governments is
debated and resolved by elected representatives. Sometimes the pressure against
national action is so powerful that it prevents appropriate congressional response to problems which are dearly nationwide in scope. The fact that Congress has power to act in almost every legislative area does not mean that the
power is abused.
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John Marshall wrote for an audience long since dead. Whether he meant this
or that in McCulloch seems less important in today's world than whether we
are more likely to choke on automobile exhaust and industrial waste with or
without federal legislation providing environmental protection. Likewise, the
"states' rights" to keep Blacks from buying into white suburbs is not really
an appealing argument for this century (and should not have been for the last).
If the expansionist interpretation of McCulloch has provided a handy error for
reaching practical results, it may be best not to foul up the system by making
too much of Marshall's musings.
JOHN MIXON*

How To Use Financial Statements: A Handbook for Lawyers. By Irving
Kellogg. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1969. Pp. vii, 505. $19.50.
In 1969, the shares of conglomerate corporations lost value even more drastically than the general market. One small conglomerate stock, however, is
notable because of its almost total loss of value during 1969. After trading at
a high of more than twenty-four dollars a share during the last quarter of 1968
and the first quarter of 1969, trading was suspended in the stock of Commonwealth United in 1969.1 Trading has since been resumed, and the stock is selling
at about two dollars a share.
The spectacular rise of the stock to twenty-four dollars was due to a number
of factors, one being that the president of the company was predicting earnings
of about one dollar a share in 1968. When the 1968 annual report finally came
out in the spring of 1969, it confirmed the optimistic prediction of the president,
showing net earnings in 1968 of $10,370,366 or ninety-eight cents per share.
Included in computing the net earnings were stated revenues of $22,758,474
from "real estate." No footnote to the certified income statement suggested that
any of this real estate revenue was unusual or questionable.
Under date of June 24, 1969, Commonwealth United issued a proxy statement
containing the same statement of income previously included in its annual report. 2 The expanded information in the proxy statement cast serious doubt on
the stated earnings for 1968. Commonwealth sold certain real estate properties
at an aggregate sales price of $13,282,500 (including a $5,450,000 sale made
on December 31, 1968 of certain unimproved land in Hawaii) which properties
were acquired in 1968 at an aggregate cost of $8,115,839 of which $2,487,583
is attributable to the unimproved land in Hawaii. Net income per share arising
from these real estate sales was $.49.1 If the reference to the more detailed
* Professor, University of Houston College of Law.

1.
Dec.
2.
Aug.
3.

Commonwealth United Corp., Proxy Statement, Special Meeting of Stockholders,
29, 1969, at 17 (proxy statement mailed with covering letter dated Dec. 2, 1969).
Commonwealth United Corp., Proxy Statement, Annual Meeting of Stockholders,
4, 1969.
Id. at 19.
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description 4 is followed, one discovers that the sale "of certain unimproved land
in Hawaii" indeed merited the special mention it received. The land in question
was purchased on December 31, 1968, for $1,656,800.5 The sellers to Commonwealth were essentially the same persons from whom the company purchased
several million dollars worth of stock on the same December 31, 1968. The real
estate was "sold on December 31, 1968, for $5,450,000 to a partnership composed
of Messrs. Kleiner, Bell and Shapiro (controlling stockholders of Kleiner, Bell
& Co., Incorporated, finanical consultant to Commonwealth) and Richard A.
Freling." 6 Almost all of the purchase price in this purported sale "was originally
secured by a mortgage on the property only, but by subsequent agreement
... its payment was personally guaranteed by (some of the purchasers) to the
extent of any deficiency thereon after Commonwealth's sale of the property.'-'
It was further disclosed that Commonwealth remained obligated for the cost
of improving the property for subdivision development. The recorded gain on
this one sale was $2,963,200, or close to thirty percent of the total reported
earnings of the corporation for 1968.
Thus we see included as income, without special designation or footnote, a
gain which was doubtful because (1) the allocation of the original purchase
price of the stock and land between the two items was suspect; (2) the sale
was made to the company's financial advisors; (3) the consideration for the
sale was the land which itself was sold; and (4) the seller had not finished
his obligations with respect to bringing the land to the final state contemplated
by the sales contract, that is, subdividing. As to the last point, both accountants
and lawyers question whether a transaction is completed when the seller remains
obligated to do something to the property being sold.8
The foregoing tale is intended to illustrate a point frequently made by Irving
Kellogg in his book How to Use FinancialStatements, i.e., financial statements
cannot be taken at the face value, even when prepared and certified by certified
public accountants. That book should be very helpful to lawyers, and perhaps
to others, in providing in a simple, concise form good collections of questions to
ask and matters to pursue to determine whether a financial statement is reliable.
Moreover, especially in the last four chapters, there are many helpful hints as
to how to spot suspicious figures which should merit further checking. The last
three chapters contain case studies of common legal situations where financial
statements must be analyzed and financial data must be referred to or incorporated into legal documents. The explanation of the defects and possible ambiguities or false data contained in the illustrative financial statements proves
to be an effective means of demonstrating the techniques of financial analysis.
Mr. Kellogg comes close to asking each lawyer to become an accountant. His
4. Id. at 34-35.
5. The purchase of the unimproved land in Hawaii was subject to an $s0,000 mort-

gage.
6. Commonwealth United Corp., Proxy Statement, Annual Meeting of Stockholders, Aug.
4, 1969, at 34 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 35.

8. See Briloff, Castles of Sand, Barron's, Feb. 2, 1970, at 3.
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check lists for internal controls and auditing procedures are numerous and somewhat detailed. Perhaps most lawyers should conclude from these lists that the
answer lies in hiring their own accountant. It is not that any individual suggestion is too complicated; Mr. Kellogg is easily understandable. It is just that the
cumulative weight of the great number of matters which must be checked to
assure the accuracy of financial statements is somewhat overwhelming. On the
other hand, the detailed listing of the numerous necessary procedures would not
be overwhelming if used selectively. Questioning of an accountant as to his use
of these procedures in particular areas may help in determining whether he is
the accountant to hire. The same questions also could be helpful in crossexamination of an accountant on particular matters.
For a true novice in accounting, the basic elements of a balance sheet and an
income statement are explained and the nature of accounting principles and their
frequent flexibility suggested. However, when it comes to the rules governing
the presentation of financial data, that is, what are the "generally accepted accounting principles," the book is not wholly satisfactory. Many matters are
oversimplified, probably out of a desire to make the book readable. Complicated
matters such as pooling of interests are not treated. Most importantly, the rules
as stated are not always accurate. For example, the installment method of reporting gain is stated as the usual accounting method, although it is rejected
by the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Public Accountants (A.P.B.).9 Another similar example of failure to tell the whole story
deserves extended treatment. For many years the debate has raged as to whether
certain extraordinary items of gain or loss may properly be excluded from the
income statement and carried directly to retained earnings on the balance sheet.
The view on this question presented by Mr. Kellogg is that formerly promulgated by the A.P.B.' 0 This older view was that items which "are material in
relation to the net income of the company and are clearly not identifiable with
or do not result from the typical or usual business operations of the period...
may be excluded when their inclusion would impair the significance of the net
income so that misleading inferences might be drawn."" Although the question
of the authoritative weight of pronouncements of the A.P.B. is beyond the
scope of Mr. Kellogg's book and of this review, it is certain that its pronouncements do have significant weight.' 2 In December, 1966, the A.P.B. issued its
Opinion No. 9, abandoning the flexible older view and requiring many more
9. Kellogg at 268. Compare id. at 234-35 and Accounting Principles Board Opinion
No. 10, ff 12, Journal of Accountancy, Feb. 1970, at 66, 68-69 [hereinafter cited as A.P.B.
Opinion.]

10. Kellogg at 262.
11. Id. at 262-63.
12. The lawyer seeking an answer to the question of what are generally accepted
accounting principles will undoubtedly feel frustrated by the position of the governing
Council of the Institute of C.P.A.'s found in its Special Bulletin of Oct. 1964 (reprinted
in Journal of Accountancy, Nov. 1964, at 12). The Bulletin stated in part:
1. "Generally accepted accounting principles" are those principles which have substantial
authoritative support.
2. Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board constitute "substantial authoritative support."
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items to be included in the income statement regardless of the possible misleading inferences. Under the new view only certain types of items of gain or13 loss
specifically related to a prior year may by-pass the income statement. Of
course, extraordinary or non-recurring items are still to be segregated to permit
the careful reader of the income statement to assess their relevance. Perhaps the
older view is still a "generally accepted" method of presentation. But Mr.
Kellogg's simplified approach, here as elsewhere in the book, could mislead
the reader.
The relatively rare inadequacies in discussing what are the proper accounting
rules do not impair the value of the book as an introduction to accounting and
as a source for questions to ask to determine accuracy. If the lawyer wants to
go beyond merely understanding the figures and assessing their accuracy and
approach the question of whether they are presented in accord with generally
accepted accounting principles, he will undoubtedly consult with an accountant
familiar with the most recent theories and opinions as to what is acceptable
accounting. He may also wish to consult more extensive treatises. In all events,
he should apply his own training to look for substance rather than form in
deciding whether the financial statements present a true picture for the purpose
at hand and whether they have been prepared in accord with generally accepted
accounting principles. Thus, the lawyer might ask concerning the reporting of
the gain on the sale of the Hawaiian land by Commonwealth United whether
the transaction was reliable evidence of the future profitability of the company
and whether the manner in which it was presented was an unacceptable showing
of assets at appraised values rather than cost values,1 4 rather than a proper application of the usual rule that gain is recognized when title passes.*r
HAL M. SmTH*

International Telecommunication Control. By Delbert D. Smith. Leyden:
A.W. Sijhoff. 1969. Pp. xvi, 231. $8.11 (approx.).
"Beginning in 1972, millions of villagers in India will be able, through television broadcasts from orbiting satellite, to see shows on community sets about
planting and cultivating crops, about the proper use of pesticides and about
birth-control practices.
The spacecraft would be designed to beam a more powerful and more highly
3. "Substantial authoritative support" can exist for accounting principles that differ
from Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board. For a recent comment on the problem,
see Letter from Stanley Marcus to Journal of Accountancy, Feb. 1970, at 25. As to the re-

cent failure of the Institute to elevate the standing of the A.P.B. Opinions, see Journal of

Accountancy, Feb. 1970, at 7, 29.
13. A.PB. Opinion No. 9, ff 23, Journal of Accountancy, Feb. 1967, at 55, 58.

14. Kellogg at 184.
15. Id. at 268. For one view on the question, see S.E.C. Accounting Series Release No.
95, Dec. 28, 1962, 28 Fed. Reg. 276 (1963).
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
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focused television signal than is transmitted by present communication satellites.
In this way it should be possible for $500 receiving stations in Indian villages
to pick up the signal and amplify it for regular television sets in community
centers."'
Will Pakistan, or other states which may lie within the cone of the signal,
have any recourse if they object to the program content? When technology
produces a still greater signal strength, and receivers capable of direct reception
of satellite broadcasts, what will be the rights of a state which is the unintended
recipient of the unwelcome broadcasting of a state whose deliberate object is
unwelcome, perhaps even subversive, broadcasts? Incipient broadcasts from
space dramatize and accelerate the dilemma posed by radio broadcasts such
as those of Voice of America, and of Radio Luxembourg. Dr. Delbert D. Smith
focuses on the problem of such unwelcome broadcasts. 2 In the course of his
analysis, he presents a competent summary of the range of international problems arising from broadcasting. He seeks to place transnational broadcasting
within a broad context of existing doctrines of international law, recent practices,
and organizational structures which have been created to deal with those and
related problems. Throughout his development, Dr. Smith provides the reader
with valuable insights into the technology which has given rise to the issues
law has been called upon to meet. Finally, he offers certain proposals, normative
and structural, for dealing with unwelcome broadcasts and related questions.
In his initial review of general principles of international law, Dr. Smith
relies on the theory of territorial sovereignty over superjacent airspace as the
basis for a claimed right to exclude unwelcome broadcasts. Jamming is thus
seen as a means of implementing this claimed right. This traditional view is
contrasted with the developing norm of a free flow of ideas and opinions, as
exemplified by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3 the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights,4 and the U.N. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.3 The author points to the fallacious
1. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1969, at 1, cols. 2-3, at 12, col. 1.
2. The author generally uses the term "telecommunication," which he defines, for
purposes of this book, as "broadcasting services, by which are meant telecommunication
[in the broader sense] services designed for reception by the general public, Irrespective
of whether the transmission is of sound or images and is accomplished by radio, optical,
or other electromagnetic systems." D. Smith, International Telecommunication Control 1
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Smith]. The phrase "unwelcome broadcasts" is the reviewer's.
3. Article 19: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." G.A. Res. 217 [III],
U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71, 74-75 (1948).
4. Article 10 (1): "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent
States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises." Nov.
4, 1950, art. 10 (1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230.

5. Article 19: "1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
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foundation of the theory of airspace sovereignty-a totally none.dstent "disturbance" of the air by the "radio waves"-but makes it clear that legal theory
has neither inhibited deliberate external broadcasts, nor deterred their jamming.
The creative use of traditional legal doctrine to resolve modem problems is
most evident in Dr. Smith's discussion of "pirate" radio stations.0 Since such
stations may either be unlicensed, located within the territory of no state (i.e.,
the high seas), or may be licensed by and located on the territory of a state
adjacent to the desired market, no single control theory will be adequate for
the receiving state that wishes to eliminate, or at least minimize, the impact
of their broadcasts. Here Dr. Smith demonstrates an impressive ability to build
persuasive legal theories by drawing upon and blending legal principles from a
variety of areas, including: the customary and conventional law of the high
seas, contiguous zones and the continental shelf; the objective territoriality

and legal vacuum theories of jurisdiction; and the "genuine link" test for
nationality of ships (and Mr. Nottebohm). 7 In considering the different possible
locations of the transmitter, he points up the importance of precise factual
analysis and provides, almost as an aside, a wealth of citations to precedents,
treaties, and other sources of law in each of the traditional areas utilized.
And Dr. Smith demonstrates how theory has been implemented in suppressing
pirate broadcasters, touching on the experience of Holland,8 Norw,-ay, Denmark,
Sweden and Finland,9

and considering in detail Great Britain's

1967

legislation. 10 Both the practices of the pirate broadcasters and the legal responses are extensively documented. Even readers with no particular interest
in broadcasting will find significance in the fact that Danish authorities seized
a pirate broadcasting ship of Guatemalan registration and treated it as if it

had no nationality, deeming Guatemala a mere flag of convenience,U and in
the fact that the Netherlands extended her criminal jurisdiction to fixed structures erected on her continental shelf beyond her territorial waters in order to
suppress a broadcaster there.12 It is almost anticlimactic to learn that Britain
2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice." Annex to GA. Res. 2200 [XXII, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, Agenda Item No. 62 at
52, 55 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) reprinted 61 Am. J. Int'l L. 877 (1967).
6. "Pirate" stations, as used here, are privately owned and operated commercial broadcasters, who earn advertising revenues by directing popular broadcasts into an area
which would otherwise be served only by a government monopoly or quasi-monopoly.
Smith at 39.
7. See The Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment of April 6, 1955,
[19551 I.C.'. 4, 23, in which, inter alia, the Court referred to the need for a "genuine
connection" between a state and its supposed national.
8. See Smith at 82-83.
9. For a discussion of these so-called Nordic Acts, see id. at 81-82.
10. Marine &c., Broadcasting (Offences) Act, 1967, effective Aug. 15, 1967. Smith at
81-96.
11. Id. at 82.
12. Id. at 82-83; for a partial text of the Dutch legislation, see id. at 82 n-54.
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deals with such broadcasters primarily by cutting off their supplies, manpower
and maintenance, and by cutting off their sources of advertising revenues. In
each case, the control is effectuated by the entirely conventional exercise of
criminal jurisdiction over activities within the territory and over British
nationals.
But while the problem of pirate broadcasters was not too difficult to resolve,
Dr. Smith is less sanguine concerning the possible means for controlling broadcasts transmitted by a foreign state: "It is difficult to see what direct control
measures can be taken by a country wishing to eliminate the transmissions
of an external service short of diplomatic action and in an extreme case, jamming."' 3 This lack of effective control measure has, of course, the greatest
implications when direct broadcast satellites are considered. The potential for
such broadcasts, coupled with the probability of technological breakthroughs
which will sharply reduce the cost and size of television receivers, lends urgency
to the author's subsequent suggestions for the development of new control
techniques. But even while pointing out the present lack of such measures, the
author contributes a rich factual background to assist the reader in understanding the issue and evaluating possible solutions: he surveys the growth
and scope of such broadcasts and by way of example, treats one external
service' 4 in considerable detail. He also presents a review of information now
known concerning the size of the audience of these broadcasts and their effectiveness, and suggests the need for considerable additional research for the
guidance of policy makers in transmitting states.
Dr. Smith pays particular attention to the international regulatory and cooperative bodies that have developed in the effort to resolve telecommunications
problems. Here, too, he is less than optimistic, for example, in his appraisal
of the credibility and effectiveness of International Telecommunications Union
regulation. (ITU regulations appear to have been ineffective in dealing with
pirate broadcasters, although its recommendations" and an agreement concluded within the Council of Europe'0 encouraged the national legislation
previously mentioned.) The author discusses the growth of regional international broadcasting networks and program exchange services. In particular,
he considers the European Broadcasting Union and its "Eurovision" service, 17
and the East European equivalent, ORIT' 8 and "Intervision.'1 0 He finds
significant progress in dissemination of news and educational programs, and in
achieving international cooperation on copyright protection and related matters.
But his optimistic note is at least questionable when one considers that even
Western Europe has been unable to standardize its television systems.20 A full
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 108.
Voice of America's service to Egypt. Id. at 106-10.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 78-81.
Id. at 124-27.
International Radio and Television Organization.
Smith at 127-28.
Id. at 125.
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chapter is devoted to satellite telecommunication, with a review of the Comsat/
INTELSAT 21 structure, and of proposals for the definitive INTELSAT arrangements. Dr. Smith is particularly concerned with the role of the ITU in
the regulation of outer space telecommunications; he reviews its activities to
date, and suggests structural and other revisions which might make ITU more
effective.
In his concluding chapter, the author presents his personal appraisal of the
basic problem, and proposals for its resolution. First, he suggests that the
sole basis for objecting to the receipt of foreign broadcasts should be harmJul
effects on a legitimate interest of the receiving state; and he urges that objective criteria be developed for determining the existence of such harmful
effects. As a mode of implementing that policy, he further proposes creation
of an "International Broadcasting Commission" within the framework of the
ITU or the UN to develop those criteria, license telecommunications, and
settle disputes concerning the presence of harmful effects. This proposal and
the criteria to be applied in determining what constitute harmful effects are
developed at some length.
It is unfortunate that Dr. Smith chose to begin this work with an extended
discussion of traditional doctrines of international law2- which, though theoretically applicable by analogy to broadcasting, are dearly inadequate for a resolution of today's problems, much less those which will arise under tomorrow's
technology. This Dr. Smith himself recognizes when, subsequently, he refers
to "a new set of norms and conditions to which the development of the appropriate legal concepts must conform,'"2 and when he says that "[this new
set of circumstances calls for policy decisions to be made by State governments
in terms of the scope and content of external programming and in consideration4
of the significance of telecommunication within the total policy structure.Despite his call for fresh, policy-oriented approaches and his frequent use of
the language of policy, one cannot help feeling that Dr. Smith is more at home
when he is discussing traditional doctrines such as the regime of the high seas
and the nationality of ships, and when he is analyzing the structure of an
international organization. In particular, his proposal for an International
Broadcasting Commission is unconvincing in the light of his own discussion
of the external broadcasting services of the great powers: he failed to persuade
21 "Comsat," the United States' Communications Satellite Corporation, which acts,
inter alia, as manager for "INTELSAT," the system organized under the Agreement
Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite
System (Aug. 20, 1964, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.I.A.S. No. 5646, 514 U.N.TS. 26), and
the Special Agreement thereunder (Aug. 20, 1964, [1964] 15 US.T. 1745, TJ.A.S. No.
5646, 514 U.N.T.S. 48).
22. Compare this, for example, with A. Haley, Space Law and Government (1963),
where the chapter on "Space Communications" begins with a detailed exposition of the
technical aspects of a radio system. Dr. Smith has scattered his exposition of technology
through his text.
23. Smith at 99.
24. Id.
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this reader, at least, that the state interest in promoting "world order and
stability" 25 is sufficient to outweigh those state interests which have generated
the flood of external broadcasts now crowding the airwaves. Neither is it clear
that interest in stability and order is likely, in the near future, to outweigh
the desire to retain almost unrestricted state sovereignty; yet that sovereignty
has produced extensive failure to comply even with today's minimal obligations
for frequency registration and control. 26 His proposals, in short, seem more the
product of technically informed idealism than the product of an appraisal of
the state conduct and interests he has so ably set forth.
International Telecommunication Control will find utility and acceptance as
a reference work, as a source of information on broadcast practices and basic
technology, and as a thought-provoking invitation to seek solutions for problems
which will fast be upon us.
DAVID

J.

HALPERIN*

Supreme Court Practice (4th ed.). By Robert L. Stern and Eugene Gressman. Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1969. Pp. xliii,
908. $17.50.
All too often practice books are bleak assemblages, more resembling cookbooks than scholarly guides. But Stern and Gressman's Supreme Court Practice
is no mere collection of recipes. It is a veritable Larousse Gastronomique. It is
now in its fourth edition, and while its earlier editions have often been reviewed before, it merits notice again not only for the additions which have
been made to it, but also to expose the breadth of this excellent book to a
new generation of lawyers who have come to look to the Supreme Court for
broad leadership in law reform, and who will consequently need a guide.
The latest edition of Stern and Gressman was necessitated largely by the
1967 Supreme Court Rules, which have been integrated into the rewritten
text. Besides the textual changes, there is an entirely new chapter on the single
appendix rule, perhaps the biggest addition made by the 1967 Rules. Under
the new practice, the parties contribute to a single joint appendix rather than
filing separate, often repetitive, appendices. There is also a new chapter on
"In Forma Pauperis Proceedings," which have increased in recent years to constitute more than fifty percent of the cases filed in the Supreme Court.1 These
changes alone make the new edition worthwhile; yet it is important to note
25. Id. at 187.
26. Dr. Smith points out broad failure to comply with I.T.U. frequency controls. E.g.,
id. at 30, 177. For examples of breaches of I.T.U. frequency assignments in space communications, resulting in actual interference with assigned stations, see Haley, supra note
22, at 170-71.
* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law.
1. R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 363 (4th ed. 1969).
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that they have taken away none of the delightful thoroughness of the earlier
editions.
Simply stated, this is a complete guide to practice before the Supreme Court.
As a reference book of some magnitude, it was not intended to be read straight
through. Yet because of the organization and clear writing style, it is not
painful to do so. With some selectivity,2 a few hours' reading will provide an
outstanding short course in the Supreme Court, its jurisdiction, and practice.
But it is more than that. It contains check lists for certiorari, appeals, and
cases accepted for argument. It has a full complement of forms. It tells one
what to wear and how to address the Court. It helps one through a rush lunch
on the ground floor of the Supreme Court building and tells how to arrange
special seating for friends or a spouse to watch the argument. It has floor plans
of the building on the inside covers with a legend that includes the men's rooms.
It even advises counsel how to leave an appeal or petition for certiorari with
the building guard, should one be improvident enough to arrive after 5:00 p.m.
on the last day for filing.
Some of these tidbits can be of cardinal importance. Equally important is
the discussion of the law which is thorough and reliable. A common approach
of some other practice books is to present a restatement of the Supreme Court
Rules. 3 Upon occasion this is insufficient. An example is the advisability of
moving for leave to file a brief amicus curiae prior to granting certiorari or
noting probable jurisdiction. Leave from the Court is required to file briefs
amid at this point unless all parties consent. Rule 42 (1) states that "Such
motions are not favored." Stern and Gressman indicate that this warning is
misleading, and suggest that it should not deter a potential amicus from making
such a motion should the parties refuse to give consent to the filing of a brief. 4
Moreover, they point out that "[w]hen there is doubt, as there usually is,
that a petition will be granted, statements by amid which show that the case
is generally important can be of significant aid to the petitioner." 5 Indeed, they
may understate the case. So widespread is the practice of submitting amici
briefs with appeals and petitions for certiorari that counsel seeking review
should consider seeking out an amicus on the chance that his absence might
be felt.
In other areas as well they prove to be a more useful guide to the Court
than the Rules of the Court itself. Supreme Court Rule 19, which purports
2. One wishing to prepare himself generally before he has a case could profit from
reading Chapter 1, "Introduction to the Supreme Court;" Chapter 2, "Jurisdiction to
Review Decisions of Federal Courts;" Chapter 3, "Jurisdiction to Review Decisions of
State Courts;" Chapter 4, "Factors Motivating the Exercise of Jurisdiction;" and Chapter
5, "The Manner in Which the Court Determines to Take Jurisdiction." The list constitutes the first 238 pages. This is not to suggest that the remainder of the book is formalism

which can be dispensed with. Far from it. But it can wait until a case comes and one
needs to consult specific sections.
3. See, e.g., H. Levy, How to Handle an Appeal 1201-35 (1968).
4. R. Stern & E. Gressman, supra note 1, at 320.
5. Id. at 319 (emphasis omitted).
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to state the factors which the Court takes into account in granting or denying
a petition for certiorari, is an insufficient tool from which to estimate whether
the Court will take a case. Chapter Four, "Factors Motivating the Exercise
of Jurisdiction," is a good discussion of this difficult area, and one would be
wise to review it before drafting a petition or an appeal. The authors discuss,
for example, the line of Federal Employers Liability Act cases which demonstrate the Court's lack of consistency in applying the criteria for review.0 And,
perhaps others besides occasional litigators in federal courts need to be reminded that the Supreme Court frequently reviews federal jurisdiction, practice, and procedure cases. Some of the most useful information is in Chapter
Five, "The Manner in Which the Court Determines to Take Jurisdiction." The
inner workings of the Court are essential to understanding the outward process. This chapter provides solid facts in an area where misinformation and
supposition abound in the most sophisticated circles.
In addition to factual information and good legal writing, the book offers
practical suggestions, which, for the most part, are excellent. The advice to
keep petitions and appeals short, to make briefs simple and understandable, and
to cite a few important cases rather than creating a string of numbers is all
worth following.7 Lawyers are prone to ignore these precepts anyway, but
when they write for the Supreme Court, previously latent pedantry often seems
to emerge. Occasionally, however, one may disagree with their recommendations.
The authors flatly assert, for example, that the statement of the case in a brief
should not be argumentative.8 Certainly they are correct that one should be
scrupulously honest in stating the facts of a case to any appellate court. And,
one should not leave out harmful facts in the naive thought that they will be
thus overlooked. But a real advocate should not lose a chance to make a
subtle argument. The statement of facts should not be an exception. The statement of the case should put the facts so that they are not only accurate and
understandable, but also supportive of one's position. Too strong a statement
will offend the reader. Given a choice between alienating the Court and utter
neutrality, one should err to the side of neutrality. But sterility should not
be necessary.
One of their most useful suggestions is to argue reason and principle rather
than the niceties of stare decisis, both in the brief and in oral argument. 9 The
value of this was attested to most eloquently in a recent discussion of the
Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren:
Increasingly often . . . lawyers at the bar found that arguments based upon precedent, accepted legal doctrine, and long range institutional concepts concerning the
proper role of -the judiciary and the distribution of power in a federal system
6. Id. at 174-77.
7. All this sounds a bit prosaic, but it is not. Section 6.41, for example, Is devoted
entirely to advising counsel to keep the petition for certiorari short, recommending an
appropriate range of pages and indicating the importance the Court attaches to the matter.
Id. at 307-08.
8. Id. at 468.
9. Id. at 472, 500.
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foundered upon Chief Justice Warren's persistent questions, "Is that fair?" or "Is that
what America stands for?" Such questions were profoundly disturbing to those engrossed
by the intellectual and institutional side of the law, its history, and sheer professional
expertise. No one could successfully argue in simple elemental terms that a poor
man charged with crime should not have as much chance to have a lawyer at the
preliminary hearing as one who was rich, or that cows and trees should have as
much voting power as people.' 0
Whether this advice will continue to be timely is a matter for somewhat disheartening speculation. The Supreme Court's leadership in law reform has indeed contributed to the rising expectations of minorities and the poor, and
consequently may have been a cause of the pervasive polarity our country is
now experiencing. However, frustrating those expectations by withdraing from
the role of leadership would not seem well calculated to ease that polarity.
One would hope, therefore, that the very existence of the Court will cause its
members to continue to fulfill their historic function. The Supreme Court, like
other courts, does not act independently of the world around it. Despite its
immense power to fashion its own docket, its actions take direction from the
cases brought to it. Not the least of the factors which will forge the course
of the Court in the days to come will be the lawyers and the way they present their cases.
JAMES W. MCELHANEY*
10. Cox, Chief Justice Earl Warren, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1969).
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.

